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Abstract 
We put forward a new option pricing formula based on the notion that people tend to think by 
analogies and comparisons. The new formula differs from the Black Scholes formula due to the 
appearance of a parameter in the formula that captures the risk premium on the underlying. The 
new formula, called the analogy option pricing formula, provides an explanation for the implied 
volatility skew puzzle in equity options. We also discuss the key empirical predictions of the analogy 
formula. 
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Analogy Making, Option Prices, and Implied Volatility 
 
People tend to think by analogies and comparisons. It has been argued in cognitive science and 
psychology literature that analogy making forms the core of human cognition and it is the fuel and 
fire of thinking (see Hofstadter and Sander (2013)). Hofstadter and Sander (2013) write, “[…] each 
concept in our mind owes its existence to a long succession of analogies made unconsciously over many years, initially 
giving birth to the concept and continuing to enrich it over the course of our lifetime. Furthermore, at every moment of 
our lives, our concepts are selectively triggered by analogies that our brain makes without letup, in an effort to make 
sense of the new and unknown in terms of the old and known.” 
(Hofstadter and Sander (2013), Prologue page1). 
 According to Hoftsadter and Sander (2013), we engage in analogy making when we spot a 
link between what we are just experiencing and what we have experienced before. For example, if 
we see a pencil, we are able to recognize it as such because we have seen similar objects before and 
such objects are called pencils. Furthermore, spotting of this link is not only useful in assigning 
correct labels,  it also gives us access to a whole repertoire of stored information regarding pencils 
including how they are used and how much a typical pencil costs. Hofstadter and Sander (2013) 
argue that analogy making not only allows us to carry out mundane tasks such as using a pencil, 
toothbrush or an elevator in a hotel but is also the spark behind all of the major discoveries in 
mathematics and the sciences. They argue that analogy making is responsible for all our thinking, 
from the most trivial to the most profound.  Of course, there is always a danger of making wrong 
analogies. When a small private plane flew into a building in New York on October 11, 2006, the 
analogy with the events of September 11, 2001 was irrepressible and the Dow Jones Index fell 
sharply in response. 
  Recent experimental evidence suggests that analogy making plays an important role in 
financial markets. Siddiqi (2012) and Siddiqi (2011) show through controlled laboratory experiments 
that analogy making strongly influences how much people are willing to pay for call options.  These 
experiments exploit an analogy between in-the-money call options and their underlying stocks and 
show that in-the-money calls are overpriced due to participants forming an analogy between riskier 
options and comparatively less risky underlying stocks.  
 In this article, we investigate the theoretical implications of analogy making for option 
pricing. If investors are pricing a call option in analogy with the underlying stock, then a new option 
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pricing formula (alternative to the Black Scholes formula) is obtained. The new formula, which we 
call the analogy option pricing formula, provides an explanation for the implied volatility skew 
puzzle. Interestingly, the new formula differs only slightly from the Black-Scholes formula by 
incorporating the risk premium on the underlying in option price. This additional parameter is 
sufficient to explain implied volatility. We also provide testable predictions of the analogy option 
pricing formula. 
 This paper adds to the literature in several ways. 1) We show how a particular bias, called 
analogy making, leads to a new option pricing formula and explains the implied volatility puzzle. In 
particular, we show that the implied volatility skew is generated if actual price dynamics are 
determined according to the analogy formula and the Black-Scholes formula is used to back-out 
implied volatility. Our approach is broadly consistent with Shefrin (2008) who provides a systematic 
treatment of how behavioral assumptions impact the pricing kernel at the heart of modern asset 
pricing theory. However, the treatment here differs from Shefrin (2008) as we focus on one 
particular bias and explore its implications. 2) We provide a number of testable predictions of the 
model and summarize existing evidence. The existing evidence is strongly favorable to the analogy 
approach. Robust empirical testing of these predictions is the subject of future research. 3) Our 
approach relates to Bollen and Whaley (2004). They argue that, in the presence of limits to arbitrage, 
net demand pressure could determine the level and the slope of the implied volatility curve. In our 
approach, the source of demand pressure behind the skew is analogies that investors make between 
in-the-money calls and the underlying stocks. Such analogies lead them to consider in-the-money 
calls as replacements of the underlying stocks.2 4) Duan and Wei (2009) use daily option quotes on 
the S&P 100 index and its 30 largest component stocks, to show that, after controlling for the 
underlying asset’s total risk, a higher amount of systematic risk leads to a higher level of implied 
volatility and a steeper slope of the implied volatility curve. In the analogy option pricing model, 
higher risk premium for a given level of historical volatility generates this result. As risk premium is 
related to systematic risk, this prediction of the analogy model is quite intriguing. 5) Our approach is 
an example of behavioralization of finance. Shefrin (2010) argues that finance is in the midst of a 
                                                          
2
 Option traders and investment professionals often advise people to buy in-the-money calls rather than the underlying 
stocks. As illustrative examples, see the following: 
http://ezinearticles.com/?Call-Options-As-an-Alternative-to-Buying-the-Underlying-Security&id=4274772, 
http://www.investingblog.org/archives/194/deep-in-the-money-options/, 
http://www.triplescreenmethod.com/TradersCorner/TC052705.asp, 
http://daytrading.about.com/od/stocks/a/OptionsInvest.htm 
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paradigm shift, from a neoclassical based framework to a psychologically based framework. 
Behavioralizing finance  is the process of replacing neoclassical assumptions with behavioral 
counterparts.  
In general, pricing models that have been proposed to explain the implied volatility skew can 
be classified into three broad categories: 1) Stochastic volatility and GARCH models (Heston and 
Nandi (2000), Duan (1995), Heston (1993), Melino and Turnbull (1990), Wiggins (1987), and Hull 
and White (1987)). 2) Models with jumps in the underlying price process (Amin (1993), Ball and 
Torous (1985)). 3) Models with stochastic volatility as well as random jumps.  See Bakshi, Cao, and 
Chen (1997) for a discussion of their empirical performance (mixed). Most of these models modify 
the price process of the underlying. Hence, the focus of these models is on finding the right 
distributional assumptions that could explain the implied volatility puzzles. Our approach differs 
from them fundamentally as we do not modify the underlying price process. That is, as in the Black 
Scholes model, we continue to assume that the underlying’s stochastic process is a constant 
coefficient geometric Brownian motion. To our knowledge, ours is the only model that explains the 
implied volatility skew without modifying the geometric Brownian motion assumption of the Black-
Scholes model. Hence, contrary to popular belief, explaining implied volatility does not require that 
the assumption of geometric Brownian motion for the underlying is modified.  
Analogy making is likely to play an important role in understanding financial market 
behavior. Many researchers have pointed out that there appears to be clear departures from Bayesian 
thinking (Babcock & Loewenstein (1997), Babcock, Wang, & Loewenstein (1996), Hogarth & 
Einhorn (1992), Kahneman & Frederick (2002), Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky (1982)). Such 
departures from rational thinking have been measured both at the individual as well as the market 
level (Siddiqi (2009), Kluger & Wyatt (2004)). However, the question of what type of behavior to 
allow for if non-Bayesian behavior is admitted is a difficult one to address in the absence of an 
alternative which is amenable to systematic analysis. Analogy making may provide such an 
alternative especially when its intuitive appeal is undeniable. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 illustrates the difference between the principle 
of no arbitrage and the principle of analogy making through a simple example. Section 2 develops 
the key ideas in this paper in the context of a one period binomial model. Section 3 puts forward the 
analogy option pricing formula. Section 4 shows if prices are determined in accordance with the 
analogy formula and the Black Scholes formula is used to infer implied volatilities then the implied 
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volatility skew is observed. Section 5 puts forward the key empirical predictions of the model. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. An Example: Principle of No-Arbitrage vs. Principle of Analogy Making 
 
Consider an investor who has initially put his money in two assets: A stock (S) and a risk free bond 
(B). The stock has a price of $140 today. In the next period, the stock could either go up to $200 
(the red state) or go down to $90 (the blue state). Each state has a 50% chance of occurring. The 
bond costs $100 today and it also pays $100 in the next period implying a continuously compounded 
interest rate of zero. Suppose a new asset “A” is introduced to him. The asset “A” pays $140 in the 
red state and $30 in the blue state. How much should he be willing to pay for it? 
 Conventional finance theory provides an answer by appealing to the principle of no-
arbitrage: identical assets should offer the same returns. An asset identical to “A” is a portfolio consisting of 
a long position in S and a short position in 0.60 of B. In the red state, S pays $200 and one has to 
pay $60 due to shorting 0.60 of B resulting in a net payoff of $140. In the blue state, S pays $90 and 
one has to pay $60 on account of shorting 0.60 of B resulting in a net payoff of $30. That is, payoffs 
from S-0.60B are identical to payoffs from “A”. Hence, according to the no-arbitrage principle, “A” 
should be priced in such a way that its expected return is equal to the expected return from (S-
0.60B). It follows that the no-arbitrage price for “A” is $80. 
 In practice, finding an asset identical to A is no easy task. When simple tasks such as the one 
described above are presented to participants in a series of experiments, they seem to rely on 
analogy-making to figure out their willingness to pay. See Siddiqi (2012) and Siddiqi (2011). So, 
instead of trying to construct a hypothetical asset which is identical to asset “A”, people find an 
actual asset similar to “A” and price “A” in analogy with that asset. That is, they rely on the principle 
of analogy: similar assets should offer the same returns rather than on the principle of no-arbitrage: identical 
assets should offer the same returns.  
Asset “A” is similar to asset S. It pays more when asset S pays more and it pays less when 
asset S pays less. Expected return from S is 1.0357  
              
   
 . According to the principle of 
analogy, A’s price should be such that it offers the same expected return as S. That is, the right price 
for A is $82.07. 
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In the above example, there is a gap of $2.07 between the no-arbitrage price and the analogy 
price.  Rational investors should short “A” and buy “S-0.60B”. However, if we introduce a small 
transaction cost of 1%, then the total transaction cost of the proposed scheme exceeds $2.07, 
preventing arbitrage. The transaction cost of shorting “A” is $0.8207 whereas the transaction cost of 
buying “S-0.60B” is $1.6 so the total transaction cost is $2.4207. Hence, in principle, the deviation 
between the no-arbitrage price and the analogy price may not be corrected due to transaction costs. 
Next, we illustrate the key ideas in a binomial context. 
 
2. Analogy Making: The Binomial Case 
Consider a simple two state world. The equally likely states are Red, and Blue. There is a stock with 
payoffs           corresponding to states Red, and Blue respectively. The state realization takes 
place at time  . The current time is time  . We denote the risk free discount rate by  . The current 
price of the stock is  . There is another asset, which is a call option on the stock. By definition, the 
payoffs from the call option in the two states are: 
                                                                                                              
Where   is the striking price, and             are the payoffs from the call option corresponding to 
Red, and Blue states respectively. 
As can be seen, the payoffs in the two states depend on the payoffs from the stock in 
corresponding states. Furthermore, by appropriately changing the striking price, the call option can 
be made more or less similar to the underlying stock with the similarity becoming exact as   
approaches zero (all payoffs are constrained to be non-negative). As our focus is on in-the-money 
call options, we assume: 
                    
How much is an analogy maker willing to pay for this call option? 
An analogy maker co-categorizes this call option with the underlying and values it in transference with 
the underlying stock. In other words, an analogy maker relies on the principle of analogy: similar 
assets should offer the same return. In contrast, a rational investor relies on the principle of no-arbitrage: 
identical assets should offer the same return.  
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We denote the return on an asset by Qq , whereQ is some subset of  (the set of real 
numbers). In calculating the return of the call option, an analogy maker faces two similar, but not 
identical, observable situations, }1,0{s . In 0s , “return demanded on the call option” is the 
attribute of interest and in 1s , “actual return available on the underlying stock” is the attribute of 
interest. The analogy maker has access to all the information described above. We denote this public 
information by  . 
The actual expected return available on the underlying stock is given by, 
           
             
  
                                                                                     
For the analogy maker, the expected return demanded on the call option is: 
                     
  
             
   
                                                                                  
So, the analogy maker infers the price of the call option,    , from: 
               
    
  
             
   
                                                                     
It follows,  
   
     
     
   
        
  
     
                                                                                                           
We know, 
               
     
 
                                                                                                      
where δ is the risk premium on the underlying. 
Substituting (6) into (5): 
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The above equation is the one period analogy option pricing formula for in-the-money binomial 
case. 
The rational price    is (from the principle of no-arbitrage): 
       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
If limits to arbitrage prevent rational arbitrageurs from making riskless profits at the expense of 
analogy makers, both types will survive in the market. If   is the weight of rational investors in the 
market price and       is the weight of analogy makers, then the market price becomes:3 
  
                                                                                        
 
Proposition 1 The price of a call option in the presence of analogy makers (   ) is always 
larger than the price in the absence of analogy makers (   ) as long as the underlying 
stock price reflects a positive risk premium. Specifically, the difference between the two 
prices is                                where δ is the risk premium reflected in the 
price of the underlying stock. 
Proof. 
Subtracting equation (8) from equation (9) yields the desired expression which is greater than zero as 
long as    . 
▄  
 
Proposition 2 shows that the presence of analogy makers does not change the Sharpe-ratio of 
options. This shows that the mispricing of options with respect to the underlying due to the 
presence of analogy makers is not reflected in the Sharpe-ratio as the change in expected excess 
return is offset by the change in standard deviation. 
                                                          
3
 In general, alpha weighted average is obtained if we assume log utilities.  
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Proposition 2 The Sharpe-ratio of a call option remains unchanged regardless of whether the 
analogy makers are present or not. Specifically, the Sharpe-ratio remains equal to the 
Sharpe-ratio of the underlying regardless of the presence of analogy makers. 
Proof. 
Initially, assume that analogy makers are not present. Let   be the number of units of the underlying 
stock needed and let   be the dollar amount invested in a risk-free bond to create a portfolio that 
replicates the call option. It follows, 
                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                          
Substitute B from (I) into (II) and re-arrange to get: 
                        
                
       
  
 
        
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
      
              
Where  is the elasticity of option’s price with respect to the stock price,    and    are 
returns on call and stock respectively.  It follows, 
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=
              
   
 
       
  
                                      
If analogy makers are also present, it follows, 
                                                                                                                      
  
                
                                                                                                                             
 harpe  ratio of  all with analo y a ers  
         r  r              r
            
 
          
 
                           
            
 
       
  
                                      
▄ 
 
Proposition 2 shows that the mispricing caused by the presence of analogy makers does not change 
the Sharpe-ratio. It remains equal to the Sharpe-ratio of the underlying. Hence, the fact that the 
empirical Sharpe-ratios of call options and underlying stocks do not differ cannot be used to argue 
that there is no mispricing in options with respect to the underlying. 
Proposition 3 shows the condition under which rational arbitrageurs cannot make arbitrage profits 
at the expense of analogy makers. Consequently, both types may co-exist in the market. 
 
Proposition 3 Analogy makers cannot be arbitraged out of the market if 
                                  where c is the transaction cost involved in the 
arbitrage scheme and δ>0 
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Proof. 
The presence of coarse thinkers increases the price of an in-the-money call option beyond its 
rational price. A rational arbitrageur interested in profiting from this situation should do the 
following: Write a call option and create a replicating portfolio. If there are no transaction costs 
involved then he would pocket the difference between the rational price and the market price 
without creating any liability for him when the option expires. As proposition 1 shows, the 
difference is        e         e            . However, if there are transactions costs involved 
then he would follow the strategy only if the benefit is greater than the cost. Otherwise, arbitrage 
profits cannot be made.  
▄ 
 
Analogy makers overprice a call option. When such overpriced calls are added to portfolios then the 
dynamics of such portfolios would be different from the dynamics without overpricing. Proposition 
4 considers the case of covered call writing and shows that the two portfolios grow with different 
rates with time. 
Proposition 4 If analogy makers set the price of an in-the-money call option then the 
covered call writing position (long stock+short call) grows in value at the rate of     . If 
rational investors set the price of an in-the-money call option then the covered call writing 
position grows in value at the risk free rate  . 
Proof. 
Re-arranging equation (8): 
                                                                                                                                 
The right hand side of the above equation is the covered call writing position with rational pricing. 
Hence, it follows that the covered call portfolio grows in value at the risk free rate with time if 
investors are rational. 
For analogy makers, re-arrange equation (7): 
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The right hand side of the above equation is the covered call writing position when analogy makers 
price the call option. As the left hand side shows, this portfolio grows at a rate of     with time. 
▄ 
Proposition 4 is useful in developing intuition regarding the derivation of the option pricing formula 
when we consider the general case, which we turn to next. 
 
3. The Option Pricing Formula 
In this section, we derive a new option pricing formula by allowing the underlying to follow a 
geometric Brownian motion instead of the restrictive binomial process assumed in the previous 
section.  By exploring the implications of analogy making in the binomial case, the previous section 
develops intuition which carries over to the general case discussed here. Two results from the 
previous section stand out in this respect. Firstly, the rational and the analogy price differ in one 
parameter only, δ, which is the risk premium on the underlying stock. The analogy price is larger 
than the rational price if risk premium is positive (proposition 1). Secondly, for in-the-money call 
options, the covered call portfolio grows at the rate     in the analogy case, rather than the rate  , 
which holds in the rational case (proposition 4). 
 To simplify notation, in this section, we are denoting the price of a call option by   and the 
price of a put option by   with the context making clear whether we are talking about the analogy 
price or the rational price. All other notations carry over from the previous section. Furthermore, we 
are only discussing European options. 
 In the binomial world, the portfolio      grows at the risk free rate   with time under 
rational pricing whereas it grows at the rate     with time under analogy pricing (  is the delta of 
call option, which is equal to 1 for an in-the-money binomial situation). Proposition 5 considers the 
corresponding case when the underlying follows geometric Brownian motion and derives the 
analogy option pricing partial differential equation (PDE) for call options. 
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Proposition 5 The Analogy Option Pricing Partial Differential Equation (PDE) is  
       
  
  
 
  
  
       
    
   
    
 
 
Proof. 
See Appendix A 
▄ 
The analogy option pricing PDE can be solved by transforming it into the heat equation. 
Proposition 6 shows the resulting call option pricing formula for European options. 
 
Proposition 6 The formula for the price of a European call is obtained by solving the 
analogy based PDE. The formula is            
                 where    
             
  
 
      
     
 and    
   
 
 
       
  
 
      
     
 
Proof. 
See Appendix B. 
▄ 
Corollary 6.1 The formula for the analogy based price of a European put option is 
                            
 
The analogy option pricing formula is different from the Black-Scholes formula due to the 
appearance of risk premium on the underlying in the analogy formula. It suggests that the risk 
premium on the underlying stock does matter for option pricing. The analogy formula is derived by 
keeping all the assumptions behind the Black-Scholes formula except one: the no-arbitrage pricing. 
That is, the analogy price deviates from the no-arbitrage price, however, as the next section 
illustrates, the deviation may not be large enough to justify an arbitrage scheme in the presence of 
transaction costs.  
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4. The Implied Volatility Skew 
All the parameters and variables in the Black Scholes formula are directly observable except for the 
standard deviation of the underlying’s returns. So, by plugging in the values of observables, the value 
of standard deviation can be inferred from market prices. This is called implied volatility. If the 
Black Scholes formula is correct, then the implied volatility values from options that are equivalent 
except for the strike prices should be equal. However, in practice, a skew is observed in which in-
the-money call options’ (out-of-the money puts) implied volatilities are higher than the implied 
volatilities from at-the-money and out-of-the-money call options (in-the-money puts). 
 The behavioral approach developed here provides an explanation for the skew. If the 
analogy formula is correct, and the Black Scholes model is used to infer implied volatility then skew 
arises as table 1 shows. 
Table 1 
Implied Volatility Skew 
Underlying’s Price=100, Historical Volatility=20%, Risk Premium on the Underlying=5%, Time to 
Expiry=0.06 year 
K Black Scholes 
Price 
Analogy Price Difference Implied 
Volatility 
105 0.5072 0.5672 0.06 20.87 
100 2.160753 2.326171 0.165417 21.6570 
95 5.644475 5.901344 0.25687 24.2740 
90 10.30903 10.58699 0.277961 31.8250 
85 15.26798 15.53439 0.266419 42.9400 
80 20.25166 20.50253 0.250866 54.5700 
 
As table 1 shows, implied volatility skew is seen if the analogy formula is correct, and the Black 
Scholes formula is used to infer implied volatility. Notice that in the example considered, difference 
between the Black Scholes price and the analogy price is quite small suggesting that transaction costs 
could easily prevent arbitrage profits from being realized. 
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K/S 
Figure 1 
Figure 1 is the graphical illustration of table 1. It is striking to observe from table 1 and figure 1 that 
the implied volatility skew is quite steep even when the price difference between the Black Scholes 
price and the analogy price is small. In the next section, we outline a number of key empirical 
predictions that follow from the analogy making model. 
 
5. Key Predictions of the Analogy Model 
Prediction#1 After controlling for the underlying asset’s total volatility, a higher amount of 
risk premium on the underlying leads to a higher level of implied volatility and a steeper 
slope of the implied volatility curve.  
Risk premium on the underlying plays a key role in analogy option pricing formula. Higher the level 
of risk premium for a given level of volatility; higher is the extent of overpricing. So, higher risk 
premium leads to higher implied volatility levels at all values of moneyness. Figure 2 illustrates this. 
In the figure, implied volatility skews for two different values of risk premia are plotted. Other 
parameters are the same as in table 1.  Duan and Wei (2009) use daily option quotes on the S&P 100 
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index and its 30 largest component stocks, to show that, after controlling for the underlying asset’s 
total risk, a higher amount of systematic risk leads to a higher level of implied volatility and a steeper 
slope of the implied volatility curve. As risk premium is related to systematic risk, the prediction of 
the analogy model is quite intriguing. 
 
Figure 2 
Prediction#2 Implied volatility should typically be higher than realized/historical volatility 
It follows directly from the analogy formula that as long as the risk premium on the underlying is 
positive, implied volatility should be higher than actual volatility. Anecdotal evidence is strongly in 
favor of this prediction. Rennison and Pederson (2012) calculate implied volatilities from at-the-
money options in 14 different options markets over a period ranging from 1994 to 2012. They show 
that implied volatilities are typically higher than realized volatilities. 
Prediction#3 Implied volatility curve should flatten out with expiry 
Figure 3 plots implied volatility curves for two different expiries. All other parameters are the same 
as in table 1. It is clear from the figure that as expiry increases, the implied volatility curve flattens 
out. 
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Figure 3 
Empirically, implied volatility curve typically flattens out with expiry (see Greiner (2013) as one 
example). Hence, this match between a key prediction of the analogy model and empirical evidence 
is quite intriguing. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Analogy making appears to be the key to the way we think. In this article, we investigate the 
implications of analogy making for option pricing. We put forward a new option pricing formula 
that we call the analogy option pricing formula. The new formula differs with the Black Scholes 
formula due to the introduction of a new parameter capturing risk premium on the underlying stock. 
The new formula provides an explanation for the implied volatility skew puzzle. Three testable 
predictions of the model are also discussed. Rigorous testing of these predictions is the subject of 
future research. 
  
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 
Expiry=0.06 Year 
Expiry=1 Year 
Implied Volatility 
K/S 
18 
 
References 
Amin, K., 1993. Jump diffusion option valuation in discrete time. Journal of Finance 48, 1833-1863. 
Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1997). “Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases”. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1), 109–126. 
Babcock, L., Wang, X., & Loewenstein, G. (1996). “Choosing the wrong pond: Social comparisons in 
negotiations that reflect a self-serving bias”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1), 1–19. 
Bakshi G., Cao, C., Chen, Z., 1997. Empirical performance of alternative option pricing models. Journal of 
Finance 52, 2003-2049. 
Ball, C., Torous, W., 1985. On jumps in common stock prices and their impact on call option pricing. Journal 
of Finance 40, 155-173. 
Black, F., Scholes, M. (1973). “The pricing of options and corporate liabilities”. Journal of Political 
Economy 81(3): pp. 637-65 
 
Black, F., (1976), “Studies of stock price volatility changes. Proceedings of the 1976 Meetings of the 
American Statistical Association, Business and Economic Statistics Section, 177–181. 
Bollen, N., and R. Whaley. 2004. Does Net Buying Pressure Affect the Shape of Implied Volatility 
Functions?Journal of Finance 59(2): 711–53 
Bossaerts, P., Plott, C. (2004), “Basic Principles of Asset Pricing Theory: Evidence from Large Scale 
Experimental Financial Markets”. Review of Finance, 8, pp. 135-169. 
Carpenter, G., Rashi G., & Nakamoto, K. (1994), “Meaningful Brands from Meaningless Differentiation: The 
Dependence on Irrelevant Attributes,” Journal of Marketing Research 31, pp. 339-350 
Christensen B. J., and Prabhala, N. R. (1998), “The Relation between Realized and Implied Volatility”, Journal 
of Financial Economics Vol.50, pp. 125-150. 
Christie A. A. (1982), “The stochastic behavior of common stock variances: value, leverage and interest rate 
effects”, Journal of Financial Economics 10, 4 (1982), pp. 407–432 
DeBondt, W. and Thaler, R. (1985). “Does the Stock-Market Overreact?” Journal of Finance 40: 793-805 
Derman, E. (2003), “The Problem of the Volatility Smile”, talk at the Euronext Options Conference available 
at http://www.ederman.com/new/docs/euronext-volatility_smile.pdf 
Derman, E., Kani, I., & Zou, J. (1996), “The local volatility surface: unlocking the information in index 
option prices”, Financial Analysts Journal, 52, 4, 25-36 
Duan, Jin-Chuan, and Wei Jason (2009), “Systematic Risk and the Price Structure of Individual Equity 
Options”, The Review of Financial studies, Vol. 22, No.5, pp. 1981-2006. 
Duan, J.-C., 1995. The GARCH option pricing model. Mathematical Finance 5, 13-32. 
Dumas, B., Fleming, J., Whaley, R., 1998. Implied volatility functions: empirical tests. Journal of Finance 53, 
2059-2106. 
Edelman, G. (1992), Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind, New York, NY: BasicBooks. 
19 
 
Fama, E.F., and French, K.R. (1988). “Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Prices”. Journal of Political 
Economy 96: 247-273 
Fleming J., Ostdiek B. and Whaley R. E. (1995), “Predicting stock market volatility: a new measure”. Journal of 
Futures Markets 15 (1995), pp. 265–302. 
Greiner, S. P. (2013), “Investment risk and uncertainty: Advanced risk awareness techniques for the 
intelligent investor”. Published by Wiley Finance. 
Han, B. (2008), “Investor Sentiment and Option Prices”, The Review of Financial Studies, 21(1), pp. 387-414. 
Heston S., Nandi, S., 2000. A closed-form GARCH option valuation model. Review of Financial Studies 13, 
585-625. 
Heston S., 1993. “A closed form solution for options with stochastic volatility with application to bond and 
currency options. Review of Financial Studies 6, 327-343. 
Hofstadter, D., and Sander, E. (2013), “Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the fuel and fire of thinking”,  
Published by Basic Books, April. 
Hogarth, R. M., & Einhorn, H. J. (1992). “Order effects in belief updating: The belief-adjustment model”. 
Cognitive Psychology, 24. 
Hull, J., White, A., 1987. The pricing of options on assets with stochastic volatilities. Journal of Finance 42, 
281-300. 
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). “Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive 
judgment”. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases (pp. 49–81). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Kluger, B., & Wyatt, S. (2004). “Are judgment errors reflected in market prices and allocations? Experimental 
evidence based on the Monty Hall problem”. Journal of Finance, pp. 969–997. 
Lakoff, G. (1987), Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
Lettau, M., and S. Ludvigson (2010): Measuring and Modelling Variation in the Risk-Return Trade-off" in 
Handbook of Financial Econometrics, ed. by Y. Ait-Sahalia, and L. P. Hansen, chap. 11,pp. 617-690. Elsevier 
Science B.V., Amsterdam, North Holland. 
Lustig, H., and A. Verdelhan (2010), “Business Cycle Variation in the Risk-Return 
Trade-off". Working paper, UCLA. 
Melino A., Turnbull, S., 1990. “Pricing foreign currency options with stochastic volatility”. Journal of 
Econometrics 45, 239-265 
Mullainathan, S., Schwartzstein, J., & Shleifer, A. (2008) “Coarse Thinking and Persuasion”. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 123, Issue 2 (05), pp. 577-619.  
Poterba, J.M. and Summers, L.H. (1988). “Mean Reversion in Stock-Prices: Evidence and Implications”. Journal of 
Financial Economics 22: 27-59 
20 
 
Rendleman, R. (2002), Applied Derivatives: Options, Futures, and Swaps. Wiley-Blackwell. 
Rennison, G., and Pedersen, N. (2012) “The Volatility Risk Premium”, PIMCO, September. 
Rockenbach, B. (2004), “The Behavioral Relevance of Mental Accounting for the Pricing of Financial 
Options”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 53, pp. 513-527. 
Rubinstein, M., 1985. Nonparametric tests of alternative option pricing models using all reported trades and 
quotes on the 30 most active CBOE option classes from August 23,1976 through August 31, 1978. Journal of 
Finance 40, 455-480. 
Rubinstein, M., 1994. Implied binomial trees. Journal of Finance 49, 771-818. 
Schwert W. G. (1989), “Why does stock market volatility change over time?” Journal of Finance 44, 5 (1989), 
pp. 28–6 
Schwert W. G. (1990), “Stock volatility and the crash of 87”. Review of Financial Studies 3, 1 (1990), pp. 77–102 
Shefrin, H. (2008), “A Behavioral Approach to Asset Pricing”, Published by Academic Press, June. 
Shefrin, H. (2010), “Behavioralizing Finance” Foundations and Trends in Finance Published by Now Publishers 
Inc. 
Siddiqi, H. (2009), “Is the Lure of Choice Reflected in Market Prices? Experimental Evidence based on the 4-
Door Monty Hall Problem”. Journal of Economic Psychology, April.  
Siddiqi, H. (2011), “Does Coarse Thinking Matter for Option Pricing? Evidence from an Experiment”  IUP 
Journal of Behavioral Finance. 
Siddiqi, H. (2012), “The Relevance of Thinking by Analogy for Investors’ Willingness to Pay: An 
Experimental Study”, Journal of Economic Psychology, Feb. 
Summers, L. H. (1986). “Does the Stock-Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?” Journal of Finance 
41: 591-601 
Wiggins, J., 1987. Option values under stochastic volatility: theory and empirical estimates. Journal of 
Financial Economics 19, 351-372. 
Zaltman, G. (1997), “Rethinking Market Research: Putting People Back In,” Journal of Marketing Research 34, 
pp. 424-437. 
